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HONG KONG AND BEIJING: TRIP REPORT
CLAUDE A. BUSS
Sponsored by Naval Postgraduate School
14-31 March 1992
This trip was undertaken for two purposes: to further my research
program on contemporary U.S. security policies in the region of East Asia
and the Western Pacific; and to update and revise the content of NS 3661
,
my course on China, in the Department of National Security Affairs.
The trip itself was divided into four segments: first, a series of
interviews and discussions with officials of the Consulate General, and with
local journalists, business persons and ordinary residents of Hong Kong;
second, a succession of briefings by Embassy officials in Beijing (including
the Ambassador and his counselors); third, a three-day Conference on
Economic Development and Security in the Northwest Pacific Region; and
fourth, in company with Admiral William Pendley (newly-appointed
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA-East Asia and U.S. Embassy
officials); extended sessions with Chinese members of the Beijing Institute
of International Strategic Studies, the Chinese National Defense
University's Institute of Strategic Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, and the prestigious Chinese Institute of Contemporary
International Relations.
I am especially indebted to Major Mark O'Neill (an alumnus of the
Postgraduate School) for setting up this schedule; to Lt Col Philip Yang
(another alumnus) in Hong Kong; and to Defense Attache Admiral
McVadon and Army Attache Col Mike Byrnes in Beijing, (and to their
wives and staffs) for the professionalism and grace with which they
anticipated and responded to my every concern. I appreciate their
hospitality, their assistance and their courtesies more than I can possibly
express.
The timing for this trip was singularly appropriate. While
struggling to chart a new course in East Asia, the United States has
conveniently kept China policy on the back burner. But a new day is
dawning. A new Russia is emerging; a new Japan is stretching its economic
muscle; and a new generation of leaders in China is about to replace the old
revolutionaries who have guided the nation for more than half a century.
Anyone with the slightest interest in the United States in East Asia and the
Pacific -- whether student, teacher bureaucrat or policy maker-- has need
of all the insights into the China situation that can be obtained.
I
Hong Kong is a good place to begin a study trip to China. The
airport is crowded; the discipline of the officials is exemplary; the entire
atmosphere is business-like. Outside the airport, the taxis are lined up in
order; the neon lights are blazing; every one is in a rush. Hong Kong is the
Big Apple of the South China coast.
Since the four modernizations of 1978, Deng Xiaoping has tried to
convert the Special Economic Zones of South China into little Hong Kongs.
He has grafted basic elements of capitalism (material incentives, individual
enterprise and market economy) on to the four cardinal principles of
Chinese socialism (the socialist way, democratic centralism, the leadership
of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninist- Mao Zedong thought). He
has tried to convince his people that any policy is good if it benefits the
productive forces of socialism, boasts the comprehensive strength of the
new nation and raises the individual's standard of living. Overcoming the
opposition of the hard liners, his legacy to China is "our central task is
economic development, ideological rectitude is less important." His
current line is, "we must open our doors and windows to the outside world
for a hundred years; we must be bold; we must rush ahead - we dare not
be like a woman with bound feet."
Deng does not shy away from experiments with capitalism: "let us
try share ownership and stock markets -- if they fail, we shall discard
them." His opponents charge that he is selling out to capitalism, but the
ranks of his opponents are thinning. They condemn "spiritual pollution"
and the "peaceful penetration of capitalism" but they tend to get on Deng's
bandwagon when they read his ultimatum that "whoever is opposed to
reform must leave office." He says' "we must sack the incompetent and the
mediocre, the people with ossified thinking and the officials who lack the
spirit of blazing new trails."
Deng has given his blessing to the enterprise culture of the south as
opposed to the old-fashioned communist dogmatism of the north. He and
his allies have given the officials of Guangzhou permission to turn the
whole province of Guangdong into an open area. He hopes that South
China will catch up with the 4 dragons (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,
and South Korea) in 20 years. He wants the string of new Hong Kongs to
spearhead the growth of the entire country.
Over the course of the last few years he has obtained significant
results. Shen Zhen has grown from a sleepy village of 20,000 to a bustling
city of 2 million, complete with factories, stores, high-rises, bars and an
Arnie Palmer golf course. This Special Economic Zone makes Mickey
Mouse toys, Adidas sweat pants, Yashica cameras and a host of sweaters,
brassieres, purses and shoes. Hong Kong dollars are the most acceptable
currency.
As Deng says, "When the doors and windows open, the flies and
mosquitos come in." In Guandong, bribes will get anything done. Rock
concerts outdraw Marxist study sessions, entrepreneurs outnumber
ideologues, and more people are rich than red. Prosperity has brought its
portion of sex, violence and drugs. But Guandong prosperity record is
spectacular: GNP up 13 1/2% in 1991 over 1990; industrial output up
272% with 38% of the industrial production credited to private enterprise.
No wonder the young people look longingly from the farm to city lights.
The fateful year 1997 has little dread for some Hong Kong
businessmen who still can buy a Toyota Camry for $42,000 (US) cash,
because "it is cheap." Many who have already made their millions are
hedging their bets by looking abroad for places to send their families. For
dollars or people out, however, there are more dollars or people in. Most
of the new money comes from Japan, Taiwan, Singapore or the Chinese
mainland. I found more optimists than pessimists about Hong Kong's
future. As one successful entrepreneur put it "the smart thing to do is to
find a Chinese partner and open a branch office in Shen Zhen, Beijing or
Shanghai." As the saying goes "young man, go north." Hong Kong is the
role model for the China of tomorrow, rather than the other way around.
Hong Kong and China have need of each other, and the Chinese are too
smart to kill the goose that lays golden eggs. Besides, China will have to
perpetuate Hong Kong's prosperity if it ever hopes to convince Taiwan that
"one government, two systems" is a viable possibility.
Hong Kong is the best possible post to observe what is going on in
South and Coastal China. Access to the interior is easy, so are contacts
with travellers of all nationality who move in and out of China. There is
more freedom of expression in Hong Kong than in the mainland cities and
there is practically no fear "of the midnight knock on the door." The U.S.
Defense Liaison Office in Hong Kong (the official title under which our
attaches work) is uneasy about its future. Since military attaches are not
usually set up in Consulates-General, our attaches in Hong Kong are
officially accredited to Hong Kong' mother country, Great Britain. It is
virtually certain that this arrangement will disappear in 1997.
Hong Kong lives by trade, tourism and manufacturing, but the trade
factor is most vital in Hong Kong's relations with the United States.
Without most-favored- nation in American trade with China, Hong Kong
would suffer. China's total foreign trade has grown from U.S. $ 38 billion
in 1980 to U.S. $ 135.7 billion in 1991. About one third of this passes
through Hong Kong, and most of Hong Hong's direct trade represents
ultimate trade with the United States. China's trade surplus with the United
States in 1990 was exceeded only by Japan's surplus in Japan-American
trade. Hong Kong needs the MFN treatment in U.S.-China trade, just as it
needs American support for China in such international institutions as the
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the GATT global trading
system. Together with all Chinese, Hong Kong protests against the linkage
between MFN and human rights and argues that putting any conditions on
free trade weakens the western-oriented, modernizing, reform elements in
China's leadership.
Democracy and political reform are touchy subjects in a crown
colony where privilege has always been more conspicuous than equality
before the law. British colonial administrators, prosperous foreign
businessmen, and the "Queen's Chinese" are not particularly good examples
of democracy. The word "democracy" itself means vastly different things
to British at home in Great Britain and to Chinese refugees from
imperialism or communism who have been obliged to make their living in
Hong Kong under the comparatively benign administration of the last
remnant of the British empire. Even under the Chinese after 1997,
democracy and protection of human rights will be slow in coming to Hong
Kong. Not too many people talk about these things or worry about them,
while the overwhelming preoccupations of the moment are sheer survival
or getting rich.
II
The political atmosphere in Beijing is decidedly different from that
of Hong Kong: less frenetic, less commercial, more restrained, and more
reflective of all China rather than just the limited area of the South China
coast. Beijing is the geographic heart of China including the outlying areas
of Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet, each with its own problems
and aspirations. As China's capitol, it bears responsibility for the entire
country - the North China plain, the great northwest, Szechwan, the rice-
growing south, and the minorities of the mountainous southwest - with all
their variety. The national political institutions are housed in Beijing, and
here the policies are made or modified which determine China's fate.
There is a dignity about Beijing unmatched by any other place in China.
And the city is growing: broad avenues lined with trees; more high rises;
traffic jams; luxury hotels; and a proliferation of retail stores which show
that the northern Chinese have no intention of being left behind in racing
with the southerners for reform and openness to the outside world.
It does not take long to discover that Beijing people are far less open
in talking with foreigners than their counterparts in Hong Kong or
Quangzhou. The shadow of Tienanmen in June 1989 still hangs over the
city. The courageous freedom-fighter, Wei Jingshen, the hero of
Democracy Wall a decade ago is still in jail after having served 13 of his
15 year sentence. The distinguished physicist Fang Lizhi, is still in exile as
are the thousands of Chinese students abroad who are afraid to come home.
In spite of the modernization reforms, the same authorities are still in
command of the army, the secret service, and the political apparatus who
ordered the crackdown at Tienanmen. The university campuses have been
hushed and in ordinary conversations people tend to pause every two
minutes or so to glance about them to see who is listening. A kind of
freeze settles over a meeting when one mentions Tienanmen. At best, the
Chinese in private conversations will go on the defensive with statements
like, "we have always had summary executions with us," or "many more
people lost their lives during the Cultural Revolution than at Tienanmen"
or "you Americans have no business meddling in the strictly domestic
Chinese concern for human rights."
This does not mean that the Chinese are unconcerned about foreign
opinion or ignorant about events in the outside world. The Chinese media,
of course, are tightly controlled, but half of all Chinese have access to TV
(from Japan, Korea, and CNN), to the radio, fax, videos and all the
paraphernalia of the information revolution. As individuals, the Chinese
prize freedom as much as anyone else. Youngsters revel in their freedom
of choice for brightly colored clothes and loud rock and roll music, and
oldsters rejoice that the busy-body cadres have a lot more to do than to pry
unconscionably into the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Social tensions
are felt in Beijing as elsewhere, but those tensions are tightly controlled.
Still there is no telling if, when, where or under what circumstances
another Tienanmen challenge to authority might occur.
Beijing is the arena of conflict, where reformers and hardliners
meet, where the present leaders tell the people what is going on while the
stage is being set for the takeover by the next generation of communist
leaders. The annual plenary session of the 7th National Peoples Congress
was in session during my visit in Beijing. On this occasion some 2000
representatives from all over China met to hear reports from the various
government officials on "the state of the nation," -- on what has been
accomplished during the past year, and what is in store for the.immediate
future. The National Peoples Congress is by no means a legislature; its
obligations are merely to listen and applaud. This year the reports were
decidedly upbeat. The Congress was told that last year the GDP had
increased by 7%, industrial production was up 14% and exports were up
15%. Grain production reached 435 million tons, the second best year
after 1984. Economic reforms would continue and great plans were in the
works, particularly the Three Gorges Dam over the Yangtze River. Prime
Minister Li Peng made a special appeal for Chinese scholars to return
home. He said 150,000 have gone abroad since 1978 and 2/3 of these have
not yet returned. He promised that they would be welcomed regardless of
their political inclinations.
Li Peng's report on current diplomacy was particularly interesting.
He characterized the world situation as extremely favorable, and the
opportunity for peace, stability and progress as greater than ever.
According to him, the old order has gone and new one is coming into being
The western countries are in the grip of economic recession, international
economic competition is growing more bitter, North- South contradictions
are more pronounced, and ethnic feuds are touching off more regional
conflicts. The questions of peace and development (the two top priorities
on the national agenda) still remain unsolved. Hegemonism is rampant as is
seen in the U.S. perception of a unipolar world, and power politics are the
root causes of turmoil in the world situation. China is opposed to both.
The Prime Minister and his able Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen,
boasted of great diplomatic achievements in the past year. In their view,
China has cemented good neighborly relations with surrounding countries
including Singapore and Indonesia.China backs Mahatir's East Asia
Economic Caucus and cooperates whole-heartedly in the effort to bring
peace to Cambodia. Sino-Japanese relations have returned to normal.
China has strengthened solidarity with other developing nations and stands
ready to maintain normal relations with Russia and the states of Eastern
Europe. China is "ready to contribute its share in accelerating the peace
process in the Middle East, always supporting the just cause of the
Palestinian and other Arabs." China is always ready, to work for effective
arms control and for the banning of chemical and biological weapons.
While steadfastly maintaining its traditional friendship for North Korea,
China expects that its opening to South Korea will contribute to the
reduction of tensions on the war-torn Korean peninsula. At any rate,
China is proud that its diplomacy has ensured a peaceful environment for
the country's modernization and looks forward to further participation in
the efforts of the United Nations to work for world peace and stability.
Ill
It was a challenge to get beyond these generalities and to delve
deeper into China's diplomatic problems, concentrating specifically on the
conflicts with the United States. In our meetings with the assorted think
tanks, we (admiral Pendley, selected officials from the Embassy and I)
deliberately invited confrontation with the feeling that frank discussion
would possibly lead to better understanding.*
A summary of the conversations with the Chinese in the think tanks
we visited gives an idea of their current concerns about the United States.
They realized that the United States is the only power to endanger China's
survival but they know our intentions are not in that direction. They
accuse us of wandering along an uncertain path between world dominance
and isolation. They see us as wanting to be a benevolent superpower, but
dedicated to the ultimate strategic goal of destroying the last vestiges of
communism (read China) and creating a new world order based on our
own concepts of democracy and a free market economy.
The observations that follow are strictly my own -- they must not in any way be taken
to reflect the impressions or views of Admiral Pendley or my other companions. No one
other than myself is responsible for the views expressed in this report.
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The Chinese do not favor a new world order, western style. They
are not interested in a balance of power. They do not see a multi-polar
world, but a world of separate individual powers without respective
clusters of satellites. Since the Chinese focus is on internal development,
they do not need to concentrate their relations on any single power or
group of powers. They look beyond the U.S. -centered collective defense
system in East Asia and the Pacific to a bold new age where all nations will
deal with each other on terms of equality and mutual respect. After the
turbulent experiment of war, depression, and the confrontation of the cold
war, the Chinese want the Americans to constitute a protective, but not a
dominant power in East Asia. From the United States, China expects more
help for the Third World, more foreign aid, more debt-relief, greater
transfer of technology, and freer access to the lucrative American market.
The Chinese wonder about the outcome of the current American
elections. What if a Democrat wins? What if the influence of Dick
Gebhardt or Pat Buchanan grows? In the Chinese view, the U.S. Congress
talks too much about human rights and talks down to the Chinese.
"Ideology has no place in international relations," they say, "and fanatics
like Nancy Pelosi only make the Chinese more indignant .... it never pays
to try to put too much pressure on China."
The United States underestimates the importance of China in Asia,
and pays too little attention to long-run considerations. Les Aspin even put
China on his list of potential conventional targets. China is a friendly
country and the United States should show China more respect. The West,
but not China, may be content to accept the U.S. as leader, . China is
strong among the strong, and will not accept the leadership of any one —
not the United States, nor Russia, nor Germany, nor Japan nor anyone else.
Although different from Americans in background and culture, the
Chinese insist that the basic outlook of the two peoples in international
affairs should be harmonious for one hundred years. We both stand for
stability and peace. Yet the Chinese worry about the Americans - "they
are so impulsive, inconsistent and undependable." Chinese do not
understand why Americans maintain such a might military machine.
"What are you afraid of," they ask, "is it the remnant power of Russia, or
the disparity in wealth between the North and the South, or is it a possible
nuclear explosion?"
Seeing us at the moment as a status-quo country one Chinese
remarked, "it looks funny to see progressive America as ultra conservative,
and so dependent on military might." To him, the seven scenarios recently
released by the Pentagon show that the present administration has not given
up its fantastic idea that the United States can be the world's policeman.
Some Chinese accuse the Americans of having a double standard in arms
sales and arms control, "You are the World's biggest arms salesmen yet
you want to limit and control the sales of others . . . you preach non-
proliferation but yours is the biggest stockpile of nuclear weapons." Some
ask why we think that some other nation would be more dangerous than the
United States as a nuclear threat. Their complaints are that "you make the
rules and we are asked to observe them, and that there is inadequate
consultation with us as though we were second class citizens." In their
opinion, a healthy control of arms sales demands the full participation of
all countries. Arms control should not be used as a scam for power
politics.
The Chinese argue that the increase in the military expenditures in
their own current national budget is no sign of aggressive intent. The
increase is called for only because China is so far behind in military power.
The Navy and the Air Force are in desperate need, and modernization
demands a lot of money. The Chinese insist that they must develop
according to their own socialist concepts, which are not expansive as were
the communist concepts of the former Soviet Union. The Chinese aspire to
no regional hegemony, and they see no possibility using military power, or
a multi lateral force with a strong Chinese contingent, as a means for
preserving peace and stability in East Asia. Although cultural differences
are greater in Asia than in Europe, Asia is fundamentally more stable than
Europe because of its thriving economy. The Chinese recognize, however,
that the prosperity that has come to all of Asia has been possible only
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because of the generous access to the American market and the security
afforded by the protective umbrella of the United States.
Lastly, the Chinese wonder about the staying power of the United
States. How strong is the American will? They know of our social and
economic difficulties at home. They see us as refusing to tackle our
spiritual problems while losing out in the growing competition with Japan
and Germany. In their view, our problems are far more complex and
difficult than they were in the simplistic days of the cold war. Then we
blamed all our ills on the menace of communism. Now that the cold war
has ended, the Chinese wonder if we can meet our deficits, solve our
domestic problems, and still provide the aid that is called for by Russia,
Central Europe and our neighbors in Latin America. Finally, the Chinese
ask, "what will all this leave for China, which may become even more
useful to the United States in the next century?"
It was not easy to answer this barrage of criticism and doubt, but
Admiral Pendley exhibited exactly the right mixture of rebuttal and
confidence in countering with observations on American policies. In no
single instance did a Chinese-American dialogue degenerate into argument
for argument's sake. The Chinese were assured that we would always be
involved in Asia — maybe less so because of our financial restraints. But
we will be there. When asked if the Americans were prepared to make
major changes in the EA/P region, or whether we were just scaling down
our military establishment there, Admiral Pendley stated, "we must not
dismantle too quickly. Americans must maintain the ability to protect our
interests by maintaining an appropriate force structure to operate in a
multi-polar world: where security demands more than military
technology and where an increasing number of problems are global or
transnational."
No contradiction was seen between fundamental Chinese and
American views on the long-range outlook for peace and stability. The
Chinese were assured that the Americans were not about to give in to our
political or economic adversaries in the contemporary world. Americans
were not about to roll over and play dead because our rivals were getting
1 1
stronger. We Americans will modify our strategies, make adjustments in
our use of resources, but will gather our strength to meet new
contingencies as we have done when facing up to crises in the past.
On our part, we Americans are not about to charge the Chinese with
hegemonism or insensitivity but we do have some questions about some
issues in which we have an extraordinary interest. Did the Chinese really
need the increase in the military budget? Was it absolutely necessary to
include the Spratlys and the Diaoyutai in the recent declaration of
territorial waters? Does the Chinese Foreign Office intend to (or does it
have the ability to) exert control over the various government agencies
involved in the foreign sales of missiles and various nuclear devices? Is it
not possible from a simple humanitarian point of view to release some of
the political prisoners under detention or in jail without trial? Without
compromising its sovereign rights in any way, cannot China give the world
greater assurance of its peaceful and democratic intentions with regard to
both Hone Kon° and Taiwan?
In response to questions about their own perceptions of the future,
various Chinese spokesmen saw the whole of the 1990s as a time of
transition to their own new order, singularly devoid of threats of a global
war. They do not see any major contradictions over the horizon. They see
more problems north versus north and south versus south than they see
north versus south. They also see more east versus east and west versus
west than they see east versus west. The are not to concerned about rising
nationalism and growing Islamic fundamentalism. They see further chaos
world-wide due to the destabilizing effects of democracy and the free
market system, and in the West they see great danger in the continuance of
the balance of power struggle and nuclear proliferation.
Looking ahead, China thinks Europe will be the area of major
trouble and sees nothing but further chaos there. Narrow nationalism and
economic hardship will prevail. It is silly for the United States to think
that it can cure Europe's ills -- or those of the rest of the world. The
United States should get off its global kick and look after its own domestic
and regional concerns.
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The Chinese are less perturbed than we about the fate of Russia. The
Chinese dislike intensely the developments in Russia and the rest of Central
and Eastern Europe. They do not sympathize with the American interest in
Russia and they did not applaud the failure of the Russian "putsch." They
are convinced that Gorbachev was a disaster for Russia and for the good
name of socialism. They see no difficulties in peaceful coexistence with
future Russia or with the Asian succession states in the former Soviet
Union. The Chinese and the Russians have ratified their treaties adjusting
the eastern boundaries and have concluded their pacts of non-aggression.
According to the Chinese, an eclipse obscures Russia's destiny in Asia.
Russia has no power to stand up against the United States, or Japan, or
China. Nor does Russia have any intention of doing so in the foreseeable
future. China shares the American concern about the dismantling of the
former Soviet military machine and the reduction or elimination of its
nuclear armament. But Russia's problems are at home, or in Eastern
Europe, but not in Asia. China see its own relations with Russia as
improving, and notes that the new Russian ambassador, Rogachev, is a
distinguished Chinese scholar.
The Chinese feel that they have been more successful than we in
dealing with Korea. The Chinese honor their traditional alliance with
North Korea but in keeping with their commitment they have progressed
toward better relations with South Korea. They are circumspect in their
discussions of North Korea's nuclear development and intend to exercise
their influence towards reunification, as a hope for lasting peace on the
Korean peninsula. They encourage trade with South Koreans and make no
secret of their hopes for expanded South Korean investments in China.
They have welcomed direct flights to China by the South Korean airline
and look forward to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with
Seoul.
In talking with Chinese, it does not take long to detect vast
differences in the respective approaches of China and the United States to
relations with Japan. Nothing grates on Chinese more than former
Ambassador Mansfield's dictum that "the alliance with Japan is our most
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important alliance being the key to peace and stability in Asia" The
Chinese do not feel that Japan is integrated into Asia in the way that
Germany is integrated into Europe. To the Chinese, the Japanese dream of
the Co-Prosperity sphere is alive and well, and the threat of a remilitarized
Japan is the greatest menace to the future of Asia. The Chinese have not
forgotten the Twenty-one demands, the attempted theft of Manchukuo or
the Nanking Incident. Psychological resentment has not disappeared from
the minds and hearts of Chinese who still feel victimization by the
aggression of Japan.
When the Chinese were reminded that it would be a calamity for the
Pacific area if the U.S. -Japan alliance were to be fractured, the Chinese
replied "yes, but that alliance need not be cast in concrete". . . good
relations do not require an alliance." The economic power of Japan merits
political understanding, but not a superior role for the maintenance of
regional security. The Chinese worry far more about the expansion of
Japanese military than about the possible damage of Japan-bashing. Japan
is entitled to more consultation on international problems, possibly to a
permanent seat on the Security Council of the of the United Nations, but
not to a prominent role in peace keeping in Cambodia. Japan should not
have been asked to send mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf.
The Chinese expressed no interest in the manner of settlement of the
Japanese-Russian dispute over the northern islands of Japan. It was
fascinating to watch a clever Russian diplomat try to worm an opinion out
of his Chinese counterpart, but he could elicit nothing more positive than,
"I don't give a damn who gets those frozen islands." The Chinese do not
object too much to the existing U.S. -Japan alliance because it does not
obligate Japan to come to the assistance of the United States. On the other
hand, giving the United States so much responsibility in providing for the
security of Japan, the current alliance keeps the lid on Japan's unawakened
ambitions.
So far the Chinese have not been overly worried about Japan's
spectacular economic accomplishments. In a way Japan is a role model for
China. Japan has made loans to China on concessional terms and is the
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number one foreign investor in China. But China wants further yen credits
and it has not given up entirely on the matter of reparations. During the
cold war, the question of reparations was impossible, but now it is
different. At this time, China would even welcome a visit by the Japanese
emperor so that he could offer appropriate apologies for wrongs done by
his nation to China in the past.
IV
A special feature of this China trip was attendance as one of a dozen
American delegates at a pioneering international Conference on Economic
Development and Security in the Northwest Pacific region. The
conference was jointly sponsored by the Institute for Global Concern
(China) and the Center for International Strategy, Technology and policy
(Georgia Tech, USA). In some very interesting meetings, I perceived a
new approach to current problems of the Northwest Pacific, and gained
some new insights into Chinese attitudes and policies in world affairs. The
contrast between the hardline, enigmatic policies of the Chinese
government and the warm, open, directness of the Chinese individuals
charged with the implementation of those policies was inescapable.
As one member of the Chinese delegation put it, this conference was
the first attempt after the cold war to get its priorities straight. Economic
development must come first, security afterwards. If a nation is too poor,
it never gets around to security. Traditionally, the Northwest Pacific has
been regarded as the most inflammatory confrontation point in the Cold
War. The absolute turning point from security to development was
reached by China's opening to the outside world and the collapse of
communist power in the Soviet Union. The release of the communists
from stultifying state control was matched by the free world's liberation
from its singular preoccupation with containment.
At the conference, it was pointed out that "old thinking" about the
Northwest Pacific concerned itself primarily with such concerns as the
activities of the Soviet Fleet, the 54 divisions of Soviet troops on the
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Chinese border, the return of the Northern Islands, North Korea's military
intentions, the threat of the Soviet ICBMs, and the ominous remilitarization
of Japan. Such concerns have by no means entirely disappeared. But the
"new thinking," which this conference exemplified, must address itself first
and foremost to the problems of economic development.
In papers prepared for the conference, scholars analyzed the existing
economic situation, disclosing the urgent need for economic development
in Mongolia and Eastern Siberia — and the region where Russia, China and
Korea come together. The entire area is rich in resources but is devoid of
an adequate infra structure. It is lacking in capital, management skills and
technical know-how. Its needs are so great as to demand international help.
What can be accomplished by international cooperation was indicated
by the current project of the United Nations Development Agency to
develop the delta of the Tumen River. Similar action might be hoped for
someday perhaps to develop the Sakhalin- Yakutia petroleum deposits, to
link Japan and Korea by way of Tsushima or even to construct some kind
of physical connection between the continents of Asia and North America.
Dreamers and planners always have their skeptics and critics, so the
futurists for the Northwest Pacific give rise to a full quota of problems and
questions. Who is going to pay for all these schemes? How can you expect
cooperation from people with such different cultural backgrounds and such
incompatible value systems? How will you adequately distribute the
benefits of development? How will you regulate the movement of goods
and people across international borders? How will you protect the
environment? How will you reconcile the jealous claims of national
sovereignty with the needs of international or transnational operating
agencies?
As might be expected the Russian and Mongolian delegates were
most supportive of the analyses but least optimistic about forthcoming
results. The Americans, Canadians and Japanese were most reserved
because they were most conscious of the risks and costs. Their question
was, how are you going to make these visionary schemes bankable? The
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Chinese were most enthusiastic, speaking often of the new day that is about
to break. They admitted, however, that "we cannot do a thing without
money, and we have no money." One thing the Chinese were sure of, they
do not relish the prospect of regional blocs. The North American Free
Trade Zone will hurt China and if a yen bloc were to emerge in
competition with the EC and the NAFTZ, China would still be the loser.
All the talk about economics did not blind the conference participants
to the need for continuing security. How shall adequate security be
provided so that development efforts may be carried on in peace? It was
pointed out that the mighty American military machine must be
reconstituted in a rational manner, without wrecking the American
economy or depriving the world of the security umbrella that it has
enjoyed in the last forty years. Although Soviet military might has been
demolished, dangerous weapons must still be disposed of. Russian
scientists, soldiers and sailors have been thrown out of work, but they must
be provided for if peace is to be preserved. Local armies in Asia must be
reduced in numbers and crisis atmospheres must be eased by confidence-
building measures. We all need to save the money we have been spending
on armaments.
Then some questions were asked which might be discussed at a
follow-up conference. Is it time to get rid of COCOM and the residual
United Nations armistice machinery in Korea? Is it useful to plan for arms
control or limitations on armaments in the Northwest Pacific? Is a
nuclear-free zone practical for the Northwest Pacific? Would it be benefit
to the world if an organization for Cooperation and Security were formed
in the Pacific somewhat comparable to the CSCE?
The liveliest discussions of the conference were provoked by the
topic of the two Koreas. Representatives were present from both the North
and the South. The spokesman of the North naturally extolled the assets of
his country and praised the sagacity of Kim II Sung. He declared that the
North wants to open its windows to the outside world and to cooperate
actively in any and all projects (like the Tumen delta) for the benefit of the
Northwest Pacific region. Both he and his counterpart from the South
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spoke in favor of the recently-signed non-aggression accord and the joint
declaration of deneutralization.
The joint declaration provides that "neither side shall test,
manufacture, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons." It
seems that all that is left is to provide for inspection and verification, but
the Americans at least will never take the declaration at face value until
North Korea opens itself completely to the Atomic Energy Agency's
inspectors. With the removal of tactical nukes from bases in South Korea
and from American surface ships, North Koreans agreed that the last
obstacles are being removed from converting all of Korea into a non-
nuclear zone. But the last American troops have not been removed from
Korean soil, and until that happens the North says reunification is
impossible. And the North still insists that reunification will have to be on
the basis of confederation: "one state, two systems." At the conference, the
North Korean delegate told the South Korean point blank, " If you think
that reunification is going to be achieved on the premise that the one Korea
will be a liberal democracy based on the concepts of a free market, you
might as well forget it."
It was a consolation, however, to realize that even if the arguments
continue between the two Koreas, the danger of a Korean conflict
spreading into a global war has all but disappeared.
Just as the Koreans stated their conviction that the fate of Korea was
the most important single key to further economic development in the
Northwest pacific, the Chinese begged to differ. They said, "as goes China,
so goes the Northwest Pacific." The greatest factor in the future of Asia,
in Chinese opinion, was the progress of China's reform. "We have our
problems," said the Chinese, such as increasing gaps in wealth, central
planning versus local control, and the imbalanced progress between the
Special Economic Zones and the rest of China. One speaker compared
China's reform to the Yangtze River. "Sometimes the river is unruly,
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boisterous, rapid and sometimes peaceful, silent and gently flowing, — but
old man river, he'll just keep rolling along." As one Chinese at the
Conference said, "Criticize us, make suggestions to us, if you like, but do
not worry about us."
After the Conference, my prime objective was to learn as much as I
could about China's future. For now, economic reform is solidly in the
saddle. China is in no hurry for political reform, and enjoys surface
tranquility after Tienanmen. China wants none of the chaos of Russia,
because it is convinced that order leads to prosperity, chaos leads to
decline. Further economic reforms are needed - to break the "three
irons" (the iron rice bowl, the plush jobs of the bureaucracy and the
security of state enterprise employees), to get the government off the back
of business, to slash the work force and grant higher pay to those who
survive, to reform housing and provide a system of medical care, and
above all to eliminate corruption and favoritism. Opposition still exists
from the Left (the orthodox communist ideologues like Li Peng) and from
the Right (the intellectuals seeking the 5th freedom or democracy like the
protesters at Tienanmen), but the old guard under the firm control of Deng
Xiaoping is hard at worked shaping a succession regime that will carry on
the current modernization policies.
Much is made of a current "succession struggle" but the "struggle" is
not likely to erupt beyond halls of the Politburo or the Central Committee.
Crucial decisions are made by a very few persons, five or six a the most,
who are surely near the end of their natural lives. They are the last of the
veterans of the Long March and their ideas differ more in degree than in
kind. They all advocate reform, they differ only in speed and distance.
Their decisions will be made public at the upcoming 14th Conference of
the Chinese Communist Party, when it is expected that the likes of Deng
Xiaoping, Li Channian, Chen Yun and Yang Shangkun will at last step
aside.
No successor is likely to achieve their prestige or power, and I can
only offer my best guess as to who will follow. I must caution the reader
that some one unsuspected may very well appear. One of the best China-
19
watchers I ever knew (Willys R. Peck, the long time Chinese Secretary in
the American Legation at Beijing) always put at the end of his despatches
the warning "the thing that is most likely to happen is the one that I cannot
for the life of me foresee." It is fairly certain that the present General
Secretary of the Communist Party, Jiang Zemin will not emerge as China's
next strong man. He has no power base of his own. Nor will Li Peng
continue at the top. Many consider him the fall guy of the present regime
who has had to take all the raps for everything that has gone wrong. He is
sometimes described as the most cordially hated man in all of China, Zhao
Ziyang, once thought of as the likely to be chosen by Deng Xiaoping, is
still out of favor by party hacks who consider him too liberal and far too
sympathetic with the protesters at Tienanmen. None of the lesser lights in
the State Council (the Cabinet) nor in the regional military commands is
seen as a possible successor to the heights of power.
Speculation centers on five persons of proven capacity to lead: Zhu
Rongji , the former mayor Shanghai, well and favorably know in the United
States; Ye Xuanping (son of Ye Jianying) former governor of Guandong
and credited with that province's prosperity; Zou Giahua . son-in-law of Ye
Jianying, member of the State Council and industrial leader; Li Chang
chun
.
former governor of industrial Shenyang and now winning his spurs
as governor of agricultural Henan; and finally General Yang Baibing , the
younger half-brother of President Yang Shangkun, who has risen
spectacularly in the hearts and minds of the Chinese military.
Entirely aware of the inadequacies of this report, I want again to
express my thanks to those who made this trip possible. In my own mind,
the brief moment in China contributed immeasurably to updating my
courses and helping me to understand the every changing course of events
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